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<a> Chapter 1 
Introduction <a> 
<b>The paradox of protection <b> 
There are three paradoxes in current warfare. The most immediate of the paradoxes is related 
to the rise of fatalities in many of the conflicts that explicit effort at protecting civilians have 
escalated. The declaratory objective of 12 of the latest Western war participations in Kosovo, 
Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Pakistan, Central African Republic, Somalia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Libya and Syria, has been to protect civilians from terror, conflict criminals, 
dictators or weapons that are exceptionally dangerous for the global civilians (WMDs). Yet, 
many of these wars have only been escalated after and by the Western protective 
interventions (see Chapter 4). Many of the civilians that the United States, United Kingdom, 
France and others tried to protect were against these Western interventions to start with (E. 
Brown, 2014; Hussain, 2016; Rayment, 2005). Eventually, many of these civilians were 
killed due to the escalation of the conflict due to the Western intervention.  Fatal protection 
is, indeed, a paradox. This is the failure to protect that this book focuses on. The record of 
military action that has claimed its legitimacy from cosmopolitan thinking on protection (but 
which was not necessarily an accurate reflection of the theory) will be reviewed in Chapter 4 
of this book.  
The second paradox is in the incompatibility of the perceived reality of cosmopolitan 
protection and the expectations of it as a less power-centric, more feminist approach to world 
politics. While protection of civilians could be assumed to be focused on caring and nurturing 
ordinary people, the global civilians, and to be something opposite the cold war logic of 
geopolitics (Hooper, 1998), it seems that state-centric power politics has never been far from 
operations that have a protective declaratory motive (Chapter 8). The rationale of protection 
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has offered ways to play down global institutions in favour of states. It has offered rationales 
for nationalist direct military action that tends to ignore the voice of the civilians, just as the 
cold logic of cold war did. The preference to measures that require the use of power to 
change someone else’s behaviour by means of deterrence, pressure, or destruction instead of 
engaging in direct protective and nurturing action oneself (by accepting refugees or offering 
development aid, for example) and the effect of this power centricity on conflict fatalities, 
will be investigated in Chapter 8.  
The third paradox is related to the fact that the consequences of cosmopolitan protection in 
the protective operations of the past two decades have gone against a global historical pattern. 
Usually, when zones of order expand at the expense of zones of anarchy, a lot of violence 
disappears (Elias, 1982; Fukuyama, 2011; Giddens, 1985; Pinker, 2011; Tilly, 1990). 
According to Pinker, for example, the move of humanity from hunting and gathering groups 
to larger agricultural, sedentary communities, starting 5000 years ago reduced violent deaths 
by 80 per cent. The transition from feudal city states to kingdoms was associated with the 
decline of homicidal violence by 90-98 per cent (Pinker, 2011, Chapters 2-7).1 
The association between expansion of security communities and decline in violence is 
understandable as more interaction takes place within rather than between communities, and 
thus more dyads of interaction take place in order rather than anarchy. In the realist and neo-
realist theories of international politics and international relations the lack of a community 
and order, the existence of anarchy, is often a permissive cause of conflicts (Waltz, 1979). In 
interaction within an existing order, say a nation state, we cannot even imagine warfare. A 
war between Birmingham and London would be unimaginable, and today a war between 
Germany and France would be almost as unimaginable, given the developing European 
security community. In addition to the realist theories or anarchy and order, all this has been 
explained in the theories of communities, common identities and common norms in the 
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constructivist and English schools (Adler & Barnett, 1998; A. Burke, 2013; Buzan & Wæver, 
2003; Deutsch et al., 1955; Kratochwil, 1989; Linklater, 2011; Taylor, 1982; Wæver, 1996).  
Cosmopolitan protection has been seen as a sign of gradual transformation of national 
security thinking and the national security communities into global security thinking and a 
global security community (A. Burke, 2013; Gholiagha, 2015; Kaldor, 2003, 2012, 2013; 
Linklater, 2002; Mello, 2010; Münkler, 2002; Seybolt, 2007; Shaw, 2003). Yet, this 
expansion of security communities has not brought about peace. This is the third paradox of 
current warfare.  
This book will explain and make sense of these three apparent paradoxes. It will explain why 
protection leads to escalation, why it leads to power-centric national selfishness and why it 
does not lead to a global security community. This is the focus of this book.  
 
<b>Chapters of the book<b> 
To answer the question of why protection fails one needs to follow the path to failure 
backwards from the end to the beginning: The first instrumental question one needs to answer 
is why efforts at the protection of global civilians were resisted. Answer to this question 
makes sense to the reasons of the escalation of conflict. Secondly, I need to answer how did 
the practice of military protection get features that fuelled resistance and offered perceived 
justification for enemy’s violence. Before I can answer these questions, however, I will have 
to answer the question about how much, and in which ways, has the practice of military 
protection of civilians been a failure. This book assumes the number of fatalities as the main 
criterion of success and failure of a military operation to protect. An operation has been a 
failure if it has failed to reduce the number of fatalities. Of course, civilians need protection 
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against brutal treatment, not against killings, but if we make sense of the scale of fatalities, it 
is likely that brutality is in proportion to the number of fatalities, too.  
Since the original situation before protective interventions has been that of a lack of norms, 
structures, institutions and enforcement of order in fragile states, then the question we must 
pose to find out whether military protection has failed or succeeded is also whether and in 
what ways have international protective interventions affected these structures and state 
fragility. In other words, before trying to explain why cosmopolitan protection fails or 
succeeds, we will have to investigate how the consequences of these protective operations are 
associated with conflict fatalities and state fragility.   
These two questions – has protection failed, and why – will be approached in this book first, 
in Chapters 2 and 3, by identifying the conditions in which current warfare takes place. Here, 
this book first drills down to the concept of state fragility, which is the condition that allows 
the opportunistic violence against civilians in the first place. I will look into the analysis of 
the so-called new wars and then I will link the analytical definitions with operations to 
existing data on state fragility and identify stable and fragile states. Then I will create a 
definition and operationalization of and a distinction between new wars and protection wars. I 
will start with the empirical discovery that almost all contemporary conflict fatalities are 
produced in intra-state conflicts of fragile states. Then I will show how these wars can be 
distinguished between those that are intervened by good-willing great powers, and those that 
are not. I will identify all these cases and call the first category of wars protection wars and 
the latter new wars.  
In Chapter 4, I will then use the identification of fragile states and protection wars and new 
wars to the analysis of the consequences of protective intervention. This chapter demonstrates 
the consequences of protective interventionism on conflict fatalities and state fragility. This 
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analysis will consider all intra-state conflicts since 1995 until 20162 and study the effect of 
interventionism  
1. On the overall global numbers of fatalities and the overall global development of state 
fragility,  
2. On the state fragility and number of fatalities in countries where interventions took 
place and in countries where they did not take place.  
3. On the number of fatalities in specific conflicts.  
The main conclusion of the chapter is that most conflicts that were intervened by great 
powers with good intentions, escalated and contributed to the increase of global as well as 
conflict specific number of fatalities at the same time as increasing state fragility and 
fatalities in countries that were intervened. Compared to similar conflicts where great powers 
did not intervene, the chapter will then conclude that so far protective interventions have, 
indeed, been failures. However, the chapter will also show that failure has been uneven, with 
some cases, most clearly the UK’s intervention in Sierra Leone in year 2000, more successful 
than others. In general, it seems that especially the first humanitarian interventions, Kosovo 
1999, Sierra Leone 2000, and the first years of the intervention in Afghanistan, were more 
successful than the interventions that took place after the beginning of the war in Iraq, and 
after the transformation of interventions into a pattern where force was projected in air 
operations rather than allowing intervention forces boots on the ground.  
After Chapter 4 the book will then move to the part where it makes sense of the 
developments that have led to the failure of protection. In Chapter 5 it will review the sources 
of escalation of protection wars by looking at how enemies of protection justify their violence 
once there is an international intervention. This chapter will look at the interaction between 
hostile discourses of Slobodan Milosevic’s, Saddam Hussein’s, Muammar Gaddafi’s and 
Bashar Al Assad’s administrations and the terrorist discourse of ISIS and Al Qaeda, on the 
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one hand and the US presidential discourse on the other and traces the mutual constitution of 
legitimate violence in world politics. It shows what of the elements in the US practices and 
rhetoric were successfully used by dictators and terrorists in the construction of legitimacy 
(within their own communities) of violence against intervening forces and the original 
civilian targets. This analysis reveals that the main sources of perceived legitimacy of 
violence against civilians were related to the perceived selfishness, unilateralism and 
militarism of the Western approaches to protection. Here the exceptions of especially the case 
of Sierra Leone will be studied, too. The chapter will investigate why the UK intervention did 
not give rise to motives and justifications of increased rebel (and rebel soldier) violence in 
this exceptional case.  
In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the analysis moves an additional step backwards in the path to the 
failure of protection. These chapters will look at why Western protection has taken forms that 
can be viewed as selfish, unilateralist and militaristic. This has been done by tracing the roots 
of selfishness, unilateralism and militarism in the process of interaction between material and 
social structures and presidential agency in US foreign policy. US presidential papers have 
been analysed from 1989 for their method, agency and referent object of protection to reveal 
the trends and to identify the main texts that have then been subjected to further qualitative 
analysis. The sources of legitimacy of selfishness, unilateralism and militarism in US 
protection were then revealed and analysed, and in the end of each of these chapters trends in 
methods, agents and referent objects of protection were related to the practices of protection 
(new and ongoing protective military operations), to prove that these discursive changes had 
an impact on the types of practices of protection the United States had adopted. Also these 
chapters will pay attention to the exceptions and try to explain the variation in the degree of 
success/failure of protective operations.  
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Chapter 9 will then conclude on the recipes of failure in Western protection of global 
civilians and suggest that global democratization and inclusiveness, on the one hand, and the 
feminization of protection could be recipes for better practices of protection. This chapter will 
return to the theories, one that rejects the whole idea of failure in protection and the other that 
try to make sense of it. Before that, though, we will still have to introduce the existing 
theories and their claims and approaches to the protection of civilians in this chapter.  
 
<b>Existing literature on anarchical intra-state conflicts and the impact of external 
intervention into them<b> 
Anarchy is the fundamental underlying concept in the theory of international relations. It is the 
condition that distinguishes this field from the rest of political science. For Kenneth Waltz, the 
underlying cause permitting war to arise is anarchy – the lack of a regulatory system on the 
international level. While this general, enabling cause alone does not explain wars, it does open 
up for effective causes, which for Waltz are often particular, accidental and trivial, but are the 
more immediate causes of war (Waltz, 1968, p. 231; See also Suganami’s analysis of Waltz 
permissive or logical causality in, Suganami, 1996, pp. 35–48).  
Empirical work on conflicts has already shown that the dominant type of conflict after the 
Second World War world has been intrastate warfare (Holsti, 2006; Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005; 
Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Already in the 1980s, scholars of post-colonial security (Ayoob, 
1991; Azar & Moon, 1988c) (Ayoob, 1991; Azar & Moon, 1988c) and, in the 1990s, theorists 
on new wars (Duffield, 2001; Kaldor, 1999; Mello, 2010; Shaw, 2003) as well as some 
rationalist scholars (Fearon, 1995; Fearon & Laitin, 2014; Posen, 1993a; Van Evera, 1994) 
pointed out the fact that, while in the West (and the global north) states had grown out of 
intrastate anarchy, weaker states still lived in intrastate anarchy, where the regulatory system 
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of nation states did not exercise a monopoly on legitimate violence. This presented 
opportunities and motives for violence. Therefore, according to theorists on post-colonial 
security and the theorists on new wars, conflict studies ought to focus on intrastate anarchy 
rather than interstate anarchy. Despite the fact that International Relations is often seen as 
“Political Science of the Context of Anarchy” we should be alert to the fact that much of 
international relations is in fact orderly. Meanwhile a significant amount of intrastate politics 
is not. Between states, order exists, for example within the EU. Intrastate anarchy is prevalent, 
for example in Somalia. 
The claim that post-Cold War conflicts have generally been ones fought in fragile developing 
countries gets support from empirical studies of civil wars. These studies posit the nature of 
current conflicts is largely ethno-nationalist. As Snyder argues ethnic nationalism 
"predominates when institutions collapse, when existing institutions are not fulfilling people's 
basic needs and when satisfactory alternative structures are not readily available." (Snyder, 
1993, p. 86; See also M. E. Brown, 1996, p. 17) Rationalist theorists of intrastate conflict, such 
as Posen, Fearon, Laitin and Van Evera (Fearon & Laitin, 2014, p. 3; Posen, 1993b; See also 
Tilly, 1975; Van Evera, 1994), have explicitly applied models from international relations 
theory to the analysis of security dilemmas between ethnic groups within developing states 
with a weak regulating authority. According to this analysis, the lack of a monopoly of 
legitimate violence because of state security fragility means that even without any interest in 
violence, intrastate groups need to resort to their own capacity to defend themselves. As a result 
of internal anarchy, ethnic and religious groups can to see each other as potential threats. This 
common sentiment fuels antagonism between them (Fearon, 1995; Posen, 1993b).  
Those who study the specific problems of Third World security (Ayoob, 2004; Azar & Moon, 
1988c) have specified the internal sources of this insecurity typical for conflicts of today.  Post-
colonial scholars argue that the main conflict threat in the fragile developing countries is related 
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to the intrastate political software problems (rather than military hardware problems) of the 
state. Such problems are firstly the lack of government performance and the lack of capacity 
for the production of intended policy outcomes (security, welfare, etc.), secondly, the lack of 
national unity or common interests and identity with each other inside the nation, and finally  
the lack of legitimacy of the state and its leaders (Azar & Moon, 1988c, p. 8).   
While the existing analysis of the conditions of current warfare tends to emphasize the failing 
states as the main condition of warfare in the post-cold war era, scholarship has major 
disagreements on the following issues that are crucial for the justification of protective 
intervention. The existing literature on ethical and empirical dimensions of protection will be 
used as clarifications the alternative ethical and factual knowledge behind the practice of 
protection, while the empirical generalizations of existing literature related to the rationales of 
protection will also be used for the creation of hypotheses for this investigation on the path to 
failure of protection. The following questions are essential for our investigation: 
1. Ethics: 
a. Is it permissible to intervene into another country in order to protect its citizens?  
b. Who has the permission to protect? 
2. Diagnosis:  
a. Does state fragility cause opportunistic and greed-motivated violence by 
perpetrators and innocent civilians, or does it (also) cause grievance-based 
violence without a clear-cut distinction between the justified and the unjustified 
parties. 
b. Are states failing and thus is there an emergency that requires urgent 
international action.   





<c>On ethics of cosmopolitan protection<c> 
Cosmopolitanism is an ethical theory and thus should not be confused with theories that make 
empirical generalizations that relate to the consequences of acting on cosmopolitan 
prescriptions. Yet, there are commonalities in the thinking of cosmopolitan scholars with 
regards to the diagnosis of the world, some of which are almost necessary for the cosmopolitan 
ethics to have relevance in the realm of global military governance. This is why this book has 
a loose definition of cosmopolitanism and includes empirical generalizations of those scholars 
that define themselves as cosmopolitan theorists of international relations (Kaldor, Duffield, 
Ralph, Hayden) into the term cosmopolitanism.  
From the point of view of a study of interventions there are at least two ethical principles that 
are relevant. The first is related to that “all persons stand in certain moral relations with one 
another by virtue of the fact that they are all members of a universal community. All persons 
possess equal moral worth deserving of our respect, and certain obligations of justice with 
regards to other persons place constrains on our conduct.”(Hayden, 2005, p. 2) The moral 
principle that state borders have no moral relevance to the obligations and rights of people, and 
that thus, human rights and obligations are universal and general, and the same regardless of 
borders, is common to all cosmopolitan theories of interventions and theorists of new wars. 
While some view the cosmopolitan morality from the point of view of common utility (Singer, 
1972), rights (Vincent, 1986) or obligations (O’Neill, 2000) is not important for our study of 
interventions, but since the analysis in this book will continue along a consequentialist path it 
will itself commit to some kind of utilitarianism, in which the virtue of protection is based on 
its utility in the prevention of fatalities of war and fragility of structures that should prevent 
such fatalities from occurring.  
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An important normative distinction between cosmopolitan theories is in the question of who 
can intervene, when conflict entrepreneurs, terrorists or dictators threaten the lives of citizens 
in a country that is too fragile to be able or too distorted to even want to protect these people 
from such violence. The main difference in the theories that focus on the global protection of 
civilians is not so much whether a theory allows unilateral actors to act in order to protect 
civilians in another country, or not, but rather, whether the theory pays serious attention to the 
very question of agency of protection. While the Kantian tradition is clearly contractarian and 
assumes that norms of protection should somehow be owned by all those in the global 
community (Kant, 1999), Hayden represents the most elaborate ethical analysis that largely 
ignores the question in the analysis of the real world, while international relations specialists 
in the cosmopolitan school often simply jump over the question of agency (Duffield, 2001; 
Kaldor, 2012). Yet, as will be further analysed in Chapters 5 and 7, this question has 
tremendous consequences for the success of protection of civilians from conflict violence.  
Both in scholarly and in political literature the moral question of who has the right and 
responsibility to protect depends partly on the nature of conflicts and thus on the diagnosis. As 
will be shown in Chapter 7, a diagnosis that sees conflicts as criminal violence makes a moral 
judgement of protection by anybody easier than a diagnosis that claims that conflicts are more 
complicated, and that it is not possible to simply identify the bad guy from the good guy.  
The political discourses that will be focused on in this book mostly subscribes to the moral 
position that either ignores the question of agency in protection, or uses rhetorical strategies 
(criminalization of the opponent, hegemonic logic of global agency, the end of history 
discourse, etc.) to make the question of who protects irrelevant or confusing, as will be shown 
in Chapter 7.  
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<c>Diagnosis: Greed and opportunities or grievances, protective intervention as a cure or a 
curse <c> 
Does state fragility simply offer opportunities for conflict entrepreneurs? Does it create 
asymmetrical wars in which opportunistic perpetrators threaten innocent civilians (Bellamy, 
2016; Buchanan & Keohane, 2015; Duffield, 2001; Kaldor, 2012; Mello, 2010; Münkler, 2002; 
Thakur, 2016), or does it also create grievances that cause conflicts between equally justified 
or unjustified conflicting parties (Ayoob, 1991; Azar & Moon, 1988c; Gurr, 2000; Nafziger, 
Steward, & Väyrynen, 2000)? While the latter type of diagnosis would prescribe conflict 
resolution the former can lend support to an interventionist prescription, assuming that 
interventionist protection is morally right and strategically feasible. This study will show that 
the former diagnosis of conflicts is underlying the cosmopolitan interventionism that this book 
focuses on.  
There is a wealth of empirical analysis of conflicts that agrees that the prevalent type of 
violence in conflicts is opportunistic rather than ideological or political. Heupel and Zangl have 
shown convincingly that war economies based on criminal activities are important contexts of 
warfare of today. The fragmentation of warring parties and the economisation of their war 
motives facilitate the application of brutal violence against civilians (Heupel & Zangl, 2010). 
According to most theories that support interventionist approach to new wars, conflicts are 
motivated by greed rather than grievances: potential wealth is a much more important context 
of wars than desperation and grievances and poverty (See for example, Münkler, 2002, p. 7; 
Duffield, 2001; Kaldor, 2012, p. 2).  
Yet, the transformation of war from grievance-motivations to opportunistic greed motivations 
is not necessarily anything completely new. It may have been highlighted by the decline in the 
ideological inter-state competition between the communist and anti-communist great powers. 
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Yet, this decline did not necessarily change the situation in conflicts of fragile states. In fragile 
states, the motives for war may have been diverse and also related to grievances. Despite that 
fact that Kaldor and Münkler seem to suggest that some of the changes after the end of cold 
war contributed to the emergence of opportunistic violence that targets innocent civilians, 
Kalyvas has suggested that criminal, rather than political nature of warfare is not something 
new (Kalyvas, 2001, p. 99).  
Yet, despite the existence of criminal, opportunistic motives of violence, wars can still be 
mainly motivated by grievances. Gurr, Lichbach, Nafziger, Steward and Väyrynen haves 
argued that grievances still dominate as predictors of conflicts (Gurr, 1970, 1993; Lichbach & 
Gurr, 1981; Nafziger et al., 2000), and that only this can explain why compromises, rather than 
enforcement of norms, has been associated with the decline of conflict fatalities especially in 
the 1990s (Gurr, 2000). Regardless of whether conflicts in fragile states are driven by 
opportunities and greed, or by grievances, it seems clear that the diagnosis based on greedy, 
opportunistic and criminal conflict motives drives the reality of political interventions. When 
conflicts were not considered as political and as being motivated by political disputes on the 
terms of order, it did not make such a difference who was controlling the “local thugs” or “mad 
mortar-men” (Clinton, 2000d, p. 2146). According to Bush Jr “These are people that you just 
cannot reason with. You can’t negotiate with them. Therapy is not going to work with them. 
[Laughter] They’re coldblooded people. That’s the way they are. And we have a solemn 
responsibility to the American people to bring them to justice. We must deal with them in 
foreign lands so we do not have to face them here at home. That’s our job.” (G. W. Bush, 
2005c, p. 1317) While it seems clear that the scholarly ideas of criminal conflicts interact with 
the dominant interventionist political discourse and help the identification of the logic of 
justification of interventionism, the claim that conflicts are opportunistic and therefore can be 
ended simply by taking away the opportunities for violence can and will be tested in this study.  
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The urgency of new war theories to protect civilians has been partly based on the diagnosis 
according to which state fragility is increasing and that this is why the international community 
has to develop robust mechanisms of intervention urgently. According to new war theory, after 
the end of cold war, the lack of interest of the international community in the suffering of 
people in the anarchic zones of the third world created the new situation that was providing 
opportunities for violence and new wars. This allowed brutal, senseless violence to continue 
unchecked: ”(T)he end of the Cold War has been accompanied by an apparently reduced 
willingness and ability to control internal violence … Governments and potential insurgents no 
longer have ideological patrons who provide them with the wherewithal to commit violence 
and then expect some influence over how that violence is carried out’” (Snow, 1996, p. 46; See 
also Daalder, 1996, p. 462; Kaldor, 1999, p. 3). Thus, the policies of relative non-intervention 
that the United States and its allies implemented during the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda 
represented exceptions in which great powers did not interfere in opportunistic chaos in these 
anarchic states, even though violence and human suffering was evident.  
Even though the Rationalist theory focuses mostly where state institutions have failed, Fearon 
and Laitin suggest that anarchical states are developing towards functioning, states rather 
intrastate order being in the process of degeneration.  Fearon and Laitin, posit that in Europe 
and Latin America the violence in the earlier period was “integral to a state building process 
that actually caused a lower risk of armed conflict later on…” (Fearon & Laitin, 2014, p. 3; 
See also Tilly, 1975) Thus, according this this theory there is no increased urgency for 
international military actions. In addition to the positive, rather than negative trend in state 
strength, conflicts are neither getting any deadlier for civilians. Melander and others have 
shown that the change in war trends, from interstate to intrastate and the greater suffering of 
civilians, started a long time before the end of the cold war (Harbom, Melander, & Wallensteen, 
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2008; Melander, Öberg, & Hall, 2009). While Melander and others have tested conflict trends 
in all countries, Chapter 4 will test them specifically in fragile states.  
If conflicts are opportunistic and there is an urgency to react to them, and if reacting to them is 
morally acceptable, the remaining empirical question is whether the consequences of 
international intervention in conflicts in fragile states produces positive consequences. The 
answer of many scholars of new wars tend to be in the positive. Political and scholarly 
justifications for interventionism often use the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda as examples of 
how non-intervention results in tragedies  (Kaldor, 1999, p. 3; Daalder, 1996; Clinton, 2000a, 
p. 974; Obama, 2011). While moral cosmopolitanism does not make generalizations with 
regards to whether or not intervention can help the situation of civilians, but simply gives a 
moral justification to it in cases it does (Brick, 2009; Buchanan, 2004; Caney, 2005; Jones, 
1999; Kant, 1999), and while some cosmopolitan scholars tend to emphasize the norm of non-
interference despite their cosmopolitan commitment (Vincent, 1974), many cosmopolitan 
scholars of international relations that theorize about new wars are optimistic about the 
opportunities the international community could have in enforcing humanitarian norms 
(Buchanan & Keohane, 2015; Kaldor, 2012; Münkler, 2002). This book will mainly focus on 
the work of the latter category of cosmopolitan scholars due to the fact that their ideas seem to 
interact with the political discourses of protection. I will call these cosmopolitan scholars 
theorists of new wars.  
Yet, this study will also focus on the theoretical perspectives where incomplete cosmopolitan 
commitment or incomplete understanding of the nature of new wars lead to outcomes that are 
worse than non-cosmopolitan outcomes. Chapter 6 of this book focuses on the phenomenon in 
which a military operation is justified for international audiences by references to cosmopolitan 
justification, but which in the domestic bureaucracy and for domestic audiences is justified by 
national priorities. The former justification makes operations possible in the international 
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political realm, while the latter priorities shape the modalities of operations. Here cosmopolitan 
justification of nationally motivated and justified operations contributes to the failure of 
protection (if it can be called failure, as protection of global civilians may not have been the 
primary aim of the operation), and yet it would be difficult to claim that cosmopolitan ethics 
contributes to the suffering. After all it was the lack of cosmopolitan commitment that was part 
of the explanation for the failure. This logic in which cosmopolitan commitment suffices to 
justify, but not motivate operations, is analysed theoretically by Falk. He opposes current 
“cosmopolitan operations” because of the shallow commitment to cosmopolitan ethics.  
According to Falk “At this stage in world politics any genuine humanitarian moves by states 
are likely to be underfunded and insufficient. In contrast, interventions backed by the requisite 
will and resources are likely to be strategic in motivation, and humanitarian only in 
rationalization, such interventionary violence will be illegal and anti-humanitarian. This is the 
meaning of Kosovo.” (Falk, 2003, p. 325; For a relatively similar argument, see Gilmore, 
2014). 
The new war theory posits that in order to tackle intrastate anarchy, one should intervene and 
supress violent opportunities which could be exploited by conflict entrepreneurs, terrorists and 
dictators. According to Kaldor, "(t)he analysis of new wars suggests that what is needed is not 
peacekeeping but enforcement of cosmopolitan norms, i.e. enforcement of international 
humanitarian and human rights law." (Kaldor, 1999, pp. 124–125). Kaldor rejects an old British 
peace-keeping concept that assumes that minimal power should be used and instead subscribes 
explicitly to the Weinberger-Powell concept: use of overwhelming force which creates an 
environment negating opportunities for violence that exist in a weak system of governance in 
fragile states (Kaldor, 1999, pp. 128–129).  
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If new wars are a result of declining control and policing, then control and policing need to be 
introduced in fragile states to end violence. This logic can be found in the US rhetoric of 
cosmopolitan interventionism. The threat is opportunistic, so opportunities for violence need 
to be negated by the “overwhelming force” of strong powers (Clinton, 1997, p. 1257). Victims 
need protection and the moral basis underlying protective missions is unchallengeable (Obama, 
2012a, p. v). The common prescription of theorists of new wars is that cosmopolitan powers 
should have responsibility to protect in intrastate anarchies resorting to force if needed, even if 
this means violating the sovereignty of states that are unable or unwilling to protect their 
citizens (Bellamy, 2002; Duffield, 2001; Habermas, 2000; Kaldor, 2003; Linklater, 2017; 
Mello, 2010; Münkler, 2002; Thakur, 2016). External force should be used to block violent 
opportunities and to introduce a setting like the one in functioning states. This prescription for 
humanitarian intervention into new wars is central to the theory of new wars. For the sake of 
conceptual clarity, I will use the cosmopolitan theories of uncivil wars (Snow, 1996), 
degenerative wars (Shaw, 2003), and new wars (Duffield, 2001; Gilbert, 2003; Heupel & 
Zangl, 2010; Kaldor, 2012; Mello, 2010; Münkler, 2002) as a theoretical model for political 
humanitarian interventionist justification (although the mode of intervention is not necessarily 
exactly that described by the theory).  
Yet, even if almost all theorists of new wars agree that an international military effort at 
protection could be successful, there are differing interpretations about the ways in which real 
life protection wars have been conducted. While Habermas praised the international effort in 
Kosovo as a purely cosmopolitan effort (Habermas, 2000, p. 61), the way in which 
humanitarian law was enforced in Afghanistan, Iraq and thereafter has been explicitly criticized 
by many new war theorists (Kaldor, 1999, p. 159). While Kaldor, for example, accepts 
humanitarian interventions in principle, she criticizes Western approach for the 
misunderstanding of the nature of the fragile states. In such states, according to Kaldor, the 
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approach was old fashioned, militaristic, Clausewitzian, and aimed simply at defeating the 
enemy or forcing one’s own will on it. This is the logic of military combat in old wars, in new 
wars the intervention has to win the hearts of the people and help build the state structures that 
could then control violence (Kaldor, 2012, pp. 152–161). Chapter 8 of this book will develop 
that thesis and look at the consequences of the power-centric approach that focuses on 
protection by defeating, coercing or bribing the agent that poses an intentional threat to global 
civilians, rather than doing something to protect people from unintentional threats (by offering 
humanitarian assistance), or by approaching threats by means of mutual self-restraint (by 
developing multilateral mechanisms of arms control), or by means that do not affect the agent 
of threat (by accepting refugees). There the focus is in the discourse strand on protection, but 
the analysis makes a difference between power-oriented and non-power-oriented approaches 
to it.  
The question of whether humanitarian interventions to protect civilians are useful or not also 
depend on the agency of protection, not just on the approach adopted for protection. Chapter 7 
of this book will focus on the question of agency and ownership of protection and norms that 
protective operations enforce. New war theorists claim that there is no need for cosmopolitan 
agency (global agency that is also “owned” by the targets of cosmopolitan norm enforcement). 
Neither do they see any need for complete unanimity regarding operations of protection 
(Kaldor, 1999, p. 126). These theories can be seen as the theoretical foundation for unilateralist 
humanitarian interventionism by the United States. Still, the success or failure of Western 
humanitarian interventions cannot be completely traced back to the presumptions of the theory 
since the way in which interventions have been conducted does not completely correspond to 
the theory of new wars.  
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Some of the Rationalist scholars and the post-colonial theory disagree with this analysis. 
Fearon and Laitin (and Tilly) claim that great power rule in the Third World has generally 
created rather than solved problems. While in Europe, where state development took place 
without external interference, the creation of states lead to order, “Asia, Africa, and the Middle 
East … (which) experienced colonial and imperial wars before 1945, especially in the 19th 
century, were more likely to experience civil wars post-independence.” (Fearon & Laitin, 2014, 
p. 3; See also Tilly, 1975) This is also the thesis of post-colonial theory. While pre-colonial 
Africa and Asia had prosperous states even with some institutions of popular sovereignty, the 
slave trade and colonial intervention reversed this development. Instead, extractive rather than 
democratic institutions emerged. The difficulty of post-colonial state formation has been 
related to the growing power of elites within civil society (Mamdani, 2010) and the fact that 
new leaders of independent post-colonial states had no interest in changing the extractive state 
institutions into institutions that could serve people. Consequently, the fragile part of the world 
is not an uncontrolled chaos, it is a well-managed disorder that produces benefits to its users 
and designers. Such disorder is a consequence of the legacy of colonialism and a result of 
extractive colonial state institutions (Chabal & Daloz, 1999).  
Furthermore, Posen suggests that the United States grand strategy should be based on restraint, 
and that the “US has to give up some objectives. The coercive reform and political 
reorganization of other countries has proven expensive and "success" has proven elusive.” 
(Posen, 2014, p. 169) Fearon and Laitin describe this conclusion as typically Realist, and one 
that president George W. Bush supported before the terrorist attack 11 September 2001 (Fearon 
& Laitin, 2004). Similar Rationalist realism could be detected in the speeches by President 
Donald Trump, especially until the aerial operation against the Syrian air force base in April 
2017 (Trump, 2017b).  
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The post-colonial theory suggests a diagnosis that leans more to Posen, Fearon and Laitin than 
to the new war theories. According to Ayoob “disorder is primarily the product of the early 
state of state-making during which, as the earlier European example demonstrates, violence 
and conflict are inevitable." (Ayoob, 1995, p. 13) The problem of anarchical states is not 
something new, but rather one that relates to the early phase of state-making. The Third World 
state is not disintegrating, it has never existed (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). Ayoob contends that 
states must be allowed to develop without external interference even if this meant some violent 
and authoritarian phases. Yet, the post-colonialist theory does admit that the collapse of 
communist states of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia contributed to the expansion of zones of 
disorder: "The dismemberment of the SU and Yugoslavia at the end of the Cold War also has 
led to the geographical expansion of the Third World, which now embraces Central Asia, the 
Caucasus, and the Balkans.” (Ayoob, 1995, p. 15)  
Post-colonial theory also disagrees with the theory of new wars on the effect of external powers 
on state fragility.  Ayoob is even more extreme in his conclusions about this than Posen and 
the rationalists. Ayoob maintains that Cold War great powers did not seek to control violence 
in developing countries: "superpower involvement in Third World conflicts in supportive and 
other roles did not commit the two dominant global powers to ensure the security of their local 
clients and allies under any circumstances or to confront each other directly to ensure security 
for their allies.... Third World became the zone where East/West competition could be waged 
with minimal apparent danger of uncontrolled escalation." (Ayoob, 1995, p. 14) Thus, the 
ending of superpower interest in the Third World was a blessing rather than a curse to 
developing countries.  
Thus, according to theorists on post-colonial security, Western interference has never served 
the purpose of the developing world. Thus, avoiding such interference cannot be a problem, 
despite the fact that post-colonial theory recognizes state fragility as central to conflict 
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problems (Ayoob, 2005, p. 959). According to the post-colonial theory of security, security in 
the third world is often challenged by intrastate threats related to lack of cohesion between 
people, lack of legitimacy of the government and poor performance by the government. 
Building aid mechanisms outside of the state and the government may address the immediate 
problems of the state, but only side-lines the vital state-building project, which, in the long run, 
is crucial to the people’s security (Azar & Moon, 1988c). 
According to Ayoob, the problem of humanitarian intervention in fragile states is related to the 
perceived illegitimacy of great power agency in the Third World. While Kaldor sees the source 
of legitimacy of such intervention in the quality the operation (Kaldor, 1999, p. 159), Ayoob 
sees the lack of Third World authorship and ownership as the source of the problem. Even if 
the intervention is meant for the protection of civilians, the people that are objects of this 
protection tend to resist it because of this perception (Ayoob, 2001).  
 The reason why post-colonial and new war theorists have a very different idea of the degree 
of ownership among the people that are being protected in fragile states is partly related to the 
difference in the focus in the study of cosmopolitan protection. The struggle against the 
authoritarian leaders of communist autocrats at the end of Cold War is the favourite focus of 
the new war theorists. Theorists of new wars suggest that there was a transcontinental 
movement of citizens (P. Burke, 2004), which gave rise to the emergence of a global civil 
society (Kaldor, 2003, p. vii).  This global civil society has managed to advocate and sell the 
idea of a set of basic humanitarian norms, and a set of norms pertaining to their enforcement 
(Kaldor, 2003). Thakur suggests that the spreading of the international legal consensus can be 
identified in the introduction of a number of international conventions and agreements that a 
number of states have formally committed to and implemented (Thakur, 2016).   
22 
 
While this global civil society acts as one in  areas related to fundamental  human rights, against 
dictators, terrorists and human rights violators, it needs coercive institutions that can exercise 
overwhelming power to control and prevent the opportunities for the most extreme types of 
violations of the international humanitarian law (Kaldor, 1999, pp. 128–129).The world cannot 
wait for a world state to emerge (Kaldor, 1999, p. 126). Instead, the global civil society has to 
work with transnational institutions, such as the WEU, Partnership for Peace, NATO 
Coordination Council (NACC) and with cosmopolitan countries (Kaldor, 2012, p. 188). As 
cosmopolitan countries, or cosmopolitan powers, Kaldor considers those forces that act in 
global security for the benefit of global citizens, not for their national interests (powers that 
“constitute an intensification of trans-nationalization in the military sphere.”). (Kaldor, 2012, 
p. 139) 
However, when interventions are studied from the perspective of the third world the question 
of ownership changes. Even if East European civil society felt togetherness with their Western 
supporters, this is not necessarily the case with Iraqi victims of Saddam Hussain’s authoritarian 
violence. NATO or NACC, let alone the different coalitions of the willing or International 
Security Forces that NATO has control over or forces that consist of former colonial rulers 
might not represent the victims of violence in fragile countries, and this, according to Ayoob, 
could be the reason why conflicts may escalate with Western interventions (Ayoob, 2001). 
While the Kaldorian optimism related to the feasibility of international intervention clearly 
interacts with interventionist political discourse, the question of whether intervention protects 
or not and whether the question of agency of protection has consequences are empirical 
questions that this study can and will address.  
 <b>How can the failure to protect be studied?<b> 
23 
 
This book represents constructivist pragmatist scholarship. The reason why it is useful to 
study the success and failure of cosmopolitan protection is practical. If we continue to assume 
that whatever the global North does to the developing world has only positive consequences, 
then we cannot make informed decision on whether or not and how to interfere to violent 
unfairness in the global South.  
The reason why the focus is on the success of a strategy or an orientation and the knowledge 
behind such an orientation rather than on exogenous causal conditions of conflict fatalities, is 
practical, too. If assumed that reality is exogenously constituted rather than something that 
strategies of genuine agency can create, we would have to abandon ontologies that could 
allow our purposive action to change things in a way that would minimize conflict fatalities. 
If the focus is only on exogenous causation, and if we feel that conflicts can only be 
explained to the degree they can be explained through exogenous causal conditions 
(explanatory power of a model), we will be writing off agency that we would need to use to 
be able to utilize our knowledge to change make peace and reduce violence (Heidegger, 
1962). This is why it is also practical to try to understand social processes from inside the 
purposes of agents, as Hollis and Smith suggest (Hollis & Smith, 1990). Yet, while this study 
will start from premises that do not write off agency, it will also not assume that social 
developments simply follow our intentions. Otherwise, it would be difficult to understand 
why the willingness to protect civilians can lead to the escalation that eventually kills the 
civilians we wanted to protect. Agency interacts with social and material realities, just as, for 
example, Wendt and Wight suggest (Wendt, 1987; Wight, 2006), and the process of this 
interaction sometimes leads us to directions we did not intend to go to. Thus, the interactive 
process where agency interacts with social and material structures, requires our attention so 
that our agency could be more successful in achieving things we want to achieve.   
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However, the pragmatism of this study is not of the classical kind. Because of the fact that 
classical pragmatists focused on the materially constituted realities they could see the 
function of knowledge as instrumental. Whichever knowledge can help us deal with the 
reality around us is pragmatic in an instrumental sense. However, if the reality is constituted 
by our collective interpretations we cannot just consider instrumental pragmatism. We cannot 
just consider what tools knowledge offers for the fixing of a material condition, but instead, 
we will have to think what kind of realities our shared knowledge constitutes. A paradigm of 
race purity in a racist state can have instrumental value for the management of something we 
understand as races, but the very “knowledge” of races already creates social agency of these 
races. Instead of just thinking whether theories of race purity can be used for something 
practical, we will also have to consider whether the existence of races as political actors that 
the theory and its concepts construct, is a positive, pragmatic reality. When classical 
pragmatism only considers instrumentally what we can do with certain knowledge or certain 
paradigm, constructivist pragmatism that this study represents also considers what that 
knowledge does to us and our social realities. A constructivist pragmatist would also have to 
consider theories and concepts for the usefulness of the entity they constitute, as without our 
knowledge, theories and understanding (and convention) of many ideative entities, such as 
states as actors of international relations or money as an instrument of economic exchange, 
such realities would not exist. Thus we will have to extend our use of the pragmatist criteria 
in our assessment of the practical value of paradigms from considerations of their 
instrumental value to the practicality of realities they constitute (Kivimäki, 2016, p. 18). 
In addition to agency, practical approach to protection would require the recognition of 
interaction between agency and such elements of social structures as roles, norms and 
identities that in causal models are often seen as problematic due to their partly endogenous 
relationship with behaviour. We cannot “explain” in the classical positivist sense violence or 
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non-violence by referring to norms, roles or identities, as none of these “independent 
variables” are analytically completely separate from the “dependent variable”: one cannot 
claim the existence of a norm without anybody respecting it in their behaviour, or an identity 
of a fighter if the actor never fights. Yet, norms, roles and identities are relevant to and not 
just tautologies of violent or non-violent behaviour. By offering positive identities it is 
possible to lure a conflicting party to more cooperative behaviour, while by accepting norms 
a community can alter the behaviour of its members.  
To incorporate agency, socially constructed realities, partly endogenous social realities, and 
yet recognize also material realities, we will not be able to use all the methods that are used in 
causal modelling of behaviour. For the investigation of effects of cosmopolitan protection, we 
can start with correlative relationships between an approach (cosmopolitan protection) and 
consequences of that approach (in terms of fatalities and state fragility). However, due to 
agency and the fluidity of social structures, we cannot assume that what we can observe 
happening is something that had to happen. Instead, we will have to accept the possibility of 
alternative futures: things could have gone differently. Even the starting point of our analysis 
– the discussion of the consequences of protection – will have to be analysed with counter 
factual realities in mind. The study of processes that enabled politically feasible use of 
violence, will necessarily have to focus on the development the interaction between agency, 
the emergence of social structures and the realities of material structures.  
<c> Analysis of the consequences of protection<c> 
The investigation of extent to which military protection of global civilians has failed or 
succeeded will need a slightly different research strategy than the question of why the 
practice of protection has produced these outcomes. The first task is related to the assessment 
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of failure or success will require counterfactual analysis on the relationship between 
intervention on the one hand and fatalities and fragility on the other.  
Doing this does not require very elaborate quantitative tools: we do not want to test multi-
causal models, but only focus on the effects of one policy that can be easily identified. Thus, 
simple calculations suffice. However, the main methodological problem in this study is 
related to the problem of counterfactual reasoning: It has been suggested that the cost of 
intervention is easy to measure, while it is not possible to document the effect of intervention 
in preventing atrocities whenever such intervention is successful, since the evidence in these 
cases is missing (Paris, 2014, p. 574).  To demonstrate that an intervention has failed one 
needs to claim two things:  
1. That in conflicts that were intervened, the level of fatalities and state fragility would 
generally have been lower had there not been an intervention.  
2. That in conflicts that were not intervened, the level of fatalities and state fragility 
would generally have been higher had there been an intervention.  
Counterfactuals may be difficult to prove in individual cases, but an empirical observation of 
development in conflict fatalities in a historical era in countries and conflicts where 
interventionist policies are practiced is possible. Comparisons in similar times, between 
similar fragile countries and between similar conflicts make counterfactual analysis possible 
if we then compare cases of intervention and cases of non-intervention.  
<c>Analysis of the path to failure<c> 
The second part of this study (Chapters 5 onwards) focuses on discourses. The starting point 
of this analysis is the idea of treating text as data (Wilkerson & Casas, 2017). Textual analysis 
will be used to reveal how discourses interact with material and social structures and constitute 
social structures and how these structures interact with political agency. This investigation will 
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follow the path of failure to protect by starting from the fact of the failure that has been 
established in Chapter 4, and by moving down that path backwards first to the counter-
discourses of US protection. There the textual evidence was based on the translated speeches 
by Muammar Gaddafi (15 speeches and letters in 2001), Bashir al-Assad (4 speeches 2011-), 
Saddam Hussein (five speeches, letters or interviews to Americans), Slobodan Milosevic (9 
speeches and letters 1998-2001) and the documents by the main terrorist enemies, ISIS 
(aymennjawad archive, http://www.aymennjawad/, of Islamic state administrative documents 
with 285 documents + the so-called ISIS masterplan) and Al Qaeda (24 translated documents 
related to the US or mobilization, from the CIA depository: Bin Laden’s Bookshelf 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/features/bin-laden-s-bookshelf?start=3). Due to the fact that 
Sierra Leone is the main case of successful protection, it has received a special attention in the 
textual analysis. There the focus is in texts by the groups associated with the Revolutionary 
United Front – The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (25 Press Releases)– and the RUF 
itself (Comments related to peace negotiations). The Sierra Leonean case has been strengthened 
also by interview material among UK officials involved in the intervention in 2000.  
This textual evidence was investigated for rationales Western enemies use in their legitimation 
and justification (and mobilization) of violence. The main focus was on how the practices and 
Western discourses helped these violent actors find perceived legitimacy for their violence. 
The method of analysis of the “counter-discourse” is based on the coding of texts for their 
references to “struggl”3, “bomb”, “attack”, “struggle”, “protect”, “defen”, “kill”, “revol”, 
“rebel”, “fight” and “take up arms” (in all tenses) that refer to violent acts of the actors 
themselves in an approving manner. The qualitative analysis of the justifications of counter-
cosmopolitan violence by terrorists, criminals and dictators has identified both identitive and 
activity-related justifications, of which the following were most prominent and frequent in the 
documents by Western enemies:  
28 
 
1. Identity of the opponent justifies violence if the identity is 
a. Imperial (anti-imperialist justification) 
b. Colonial (anti-colonialist justification) 
c. Criminal (legalist justification) 
d. Foreign (nationalist justification) 
2. Action of the opponent justifies violence if the action is 
a. Power-centric 
b. Violent to people (reference to atrocities, threat to peace) 
c. Tribalist  
d. Anti-Democratic 
e. Oppressive (reference to limitation of freedom) 
f. Impoverishing/exploitative 
g. Threatening to state security 
h. In violation to an agreement/law 
Trends and cross-country/conflict differences in the strategies of legitimation of violence by 
Western enemies were then established by using NVivo.  
With these tools and with more traditional content analysis of all the selected translated texts 
of enemies of Western cosmopolitan interventions I have then established three clusters of 
rationales in Western interventions that are being used by Western enemies for the 
constitution of legitimacy of their own violence. These three clusters are selfishness, 
unilateralism and militarism. Legitimation of enemy violence that draws from what is seen as 
the Western imperial justifications, from the perceived breach of the international law on 
sovereignty, from the rhetoric of defence of the state against external aggression, 
internationally anti-democratic (powerful countries bullying weak countries), and from the 
rhetoric of oppression and limitation of sovereign freedom, have been lumped to the cluster 
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of unilateralism. Legitimation of enemy violence that draws from the rhetoric of colonial 
exploitation and impoverishment by the West, or selfish imperial power motives have been 
limped to the cluster of selfishness, while justifications that draw from the logic in which 
enemy’s violence is justified by the violence and military handling of the West are lumped to 
the cluster of anti-militaristic justifications.   
While the analysis of discourses does not imply a belief that justification of action is the only 
thing that is needed for a violent action, it commits to the idea that on the one hand texts 
reveal more than just justifications, and that justifications, too, are needed as necessary 
conditions for political action that requires mobilization of forces and resources. While it is 
politically difficult to take into account the information that enemy propaganda can offer, it 
seems that conflicts escalate in interactive processes in which the discourses and approaches 
of one side constitute the legitimacy of discourses and practices of the other side. Thus, even 
if the West should not be manipulated by the lies of terrorist discourse, such discourse 
contains information that can help avoid the escalation of conflicts.  
Texts, even propaganda can be studied as evidence if we focus on things it creates rather than 
on things it describes or refers to. Propaganda that emphasizes a norm, for instance, commits 
the speaker to it as it elevates the costs for him, of violating it (Glanville, 2018). Yet, a 
propagandistic description of the realities on the ground cannot be used as evidence of 
realities on the ground.  
This difference between the utility of studying realities that speech creates and the utility of 
studying a reality a speech describes on the basis of the speech is often misunderstood in 
political reality. According to President Bush Jr., for example, “Usama bin Laden used 
Somalia as an excuse for people to join his jihadist movement. In the past, they used the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was a convenient way to try to recruit people to their jihadist 
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movement. They’ve used all kinds of excuses. This Government is going to do whatever it 
takes to protect this homeland. We’re not going to let their excuses stop us from staying on 
the offense. The best way to protect America is defeat these killers overseas so we do not 
have to face them here at home. We’re not going to let lies and propaganda by the enemy 
dictate how we win this war.” (G. W. Bush, 2007e, p. 1703) Here Bush assumes he can 
ignore the way in which bin Laden creates normative realities in his speech, simply by 
rejecting them. Yet, Bush seems to admit the failure of his approach when he admits that US 
operations and staying in the offensive increased anti-US terrorist mobilization. Even if Bush 
does not accept bin Laden’s and anti-US militants’ rationales against the United States, they 
are still a reality if they increase anti-American mobilization. Yet, he claims it is “the best 
way to protect America”. While public statements tend to manipulate the reality in a way that 
helps the speakers bargaining leverage (by exaggerating one’s commitment and 
determination, and by exaggerating signals of division among one’s enemies), the 
construction of legitimate strategies creates realities itself, and is therefore a reality to be 
studied, not just a propagandistic picture of some objective reality. 
On the basis of the clusters of rationales that enemies of Western interventions constitute in 
their texts I will then go further backwards the path of failure to protect by examining how 
selfishness, unilateralism and militarism emerge in the Western discourse strand on protection. 
The purpose of the analysis of Western and anti-Western discourses is to reveal the interactive 
process in which both sides legitimize their violence by reference to the violence of their 
enemies. This way textual analysis reveals the mutual constitution of legitimate violence in a 
process of escalation. The analysis of the counter-discourse reveals three sources from which 
enemies of the West tend to derive the perceived justification and legitimacy their violence:  
1. The selfish nature of Western military action.  
2. The unilateralist approach of that action, and  
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3. The militarism and power-centricity in the way Western “protection” is conducted.     
From the enemy discourses this study moves another step backwards by looking at how 
elements that Western enemies in protection wars perceive as selfishness, unilateralism and 
militarism emerge into the Western practice and discourse. This will be done by means of the 
analysis of the Western discourse. Due to the central role of the United States in military 
operations to protect global civilians, and due to the central role of the United States president 
in American foreign policy, I have selected the US government Public Papers of the Presidents 
of the United States (US Government Printing Office, various years) as my primary data for 
discourse analysis of Western protection discourse. I have studied the entire period of the 
emergence of the discourse strand on protection starting from the last days of the cold war until 
the last published electronic versions of the compilation of the presidential papers (1989-
2012),4 almost 30 million words.  
Using this data, I will substantiate my claims on discourses in a more transparent, rigorous and 
convincing manner than by simply selecting sentences from various sources. Even if one does 
not assume that measurable material realities are the only reality, it is possible to avoid “fantasy 
theories” (as Schweller calls them in Schweller, 1999), by treating texts in a methodical manner 
so that they can also falsify interpretations that one originally wanted to test.  
However, instead of treating text as something that describes reality as the authors see it, this 
study is committed to a different ontology and thus a different method than most computerized 
textual analyses. It is based on the idea that world politics is not dictated by exogenous, material 
realities. Thus, my research on the social realities of protection will have to start from the 
discourses that are, on the one hand, a product of human activity, but which also facilitate and 
constrain the imagination and opportunities of human agency. The interaction between agency, 
social realities and material realities cannot be revealed by a causal analysis that seeks 
explanations of developments based on exogenous material causes, nor can it be revealed by 
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an analysis that does not recognize the importance of interpretations and discourses as social 
reality. Thus, such an analysis needs to look at meanings revealed in the texts. It must examine 
their relation to material, non-discursive events and structures as well as to purposive agency.  
To make sense of frameworks that legitimize and justify killing in a military operation for an 
audience, one needs to analyse the texts that the actor presents to this audience. In this way, 
one can understand the ontological and normative foundations and the ways in which these 
foundations are mobilized and associated with projects such as military intervention. One needs 
dispositive analysis to reveal the knowledge behind the actions and practices of cosmopolitan 
protection (Foucault, 1974). However, when investigating apparently conflicting discourses, 
as is the case when one looks, on the one hand, at protection which tends to kill the ones it 
intends to protect, and on the other, at how selfish interests enter into altruistic discourse strands 
on protection, one will probably not find a coherent set of texts within which all these 
contradictions make sense. Instead, one needs to analyse the historically specific processes in 
which the discourse strands of different issue areas meet and where compromises are needed 
and made within systems of decision-making. Different audiences can then be convinced by 
references to different types of normative and ontological premises in which dramatic events 
affect interpretations (Jäger, 2001).  
We need to study the specific histories of interaction between action and social structures, in 
which actions are constituted by existing social structures and social structures are constituted 
by interpretative actions (Wendt, 1987). If we look at ideational constructs such as 
humanitarian norms, as well as human, group or national and international pursuits to rescue 
civilians anywhere in the world, we can see that these discourses and pursuits were born and 
they developed and created the institutions that they needed to succeed through specific 
historical processes. In these processes, social and material realities enabled and obstructed, 
directed and focused purposes and norms of civilian protection. Other norms and structures 
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that political norms created affected the path from ideas to outcomes. Studying this path will 
require “discursive process tracing”, in which the focus is on texts that reflect and create 
discursive events, such as changing types of arguments, norms and interpretations, rather than 
merely material events. Quite as Justin Rosenberg has suggested such analysis of path 
dependent historically specific processes and changes requires methods that are grounded in 
historical and social analysis, rather than methods that assume ahistorical regularities (J. 
Rosenberg, 1994; See also Tickner, 2001, p. 9). It is focused on historically specific discursive 
events. These events naturally interact with changes in material realities, but they are not 
dictated by unchanging material regularities. Also, this interaction is well documented in texts 
related to political strategies on protection of civilians.  
When tracing the processes of discourse development there are junctures at which deviations 
in the original intent behind a policy discourse enter the scene. Such junctures could be found:  
a. Within the internal logic of the discourse strand that deals with protection of civilians: 
how certain types of arguments are allowed while others are not, depending on the normative 
and ontological premises of the discourse and pre-agreed-upon premises for argumentation on 
which the discourse strand is based. This part of the analysis uses the lessons of so-called 
dispositive analysis, aimed at reconstructing and revealing the knowledge lying behind 
discursive and non-discursive practices and reconstructing non-discursive practices which have 
led to the manifestations/materializations and the knowledge contained therein (Jäger, 2001, p. 
47). 
b. In the entanglements of discourse strands (Jäger, 2001, pp. 47–48) on protection and 
other interrelated issues. These entanglements are meaningful for the development of the 
normative and ontological premises of the discursive strand of protection. How, for example, 
the discourse strand on victimhood is used to depoliticize protection in the entanglements that 
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expose discussion on protection to the ontologies and ethics of debates on victimhood (or 
criminality, or security threats, or democracy) affects the way in which the ownership of 
protection is shared.  
c. In the interaction of the text with audiences as part of the discourse context of protection 
(Jäger, 2001, p. 48). It is clear that especially domestic and international audiences, rural 
national voters vs. international diplomats have very different ethical and ontological 
expectations of the US president. Thus, texts produced for these two audiences affect the 
development of the discourse strand. The requirements imposed on the president or another 
decision-maker in US foreign politics based on a situation presented to a domestic or 
international audience affects US policy in varying ways, since consistency in the statements 
and knowledge revealed in texts and actions is necessary for credibility. Sometimes, 
interpretations of the realities of world politics are created to solve problems created by the 
need for consistency. US presidents, for example, tend to favour worldviews in which national 
interests can be reconciled with international responsibilities, and sometimes the need for 
consistency pushes them towards interpretations that are not optimal in terms of credibility, or 
ones that can only be sustained by hiding the evidence against them.  
d. In the interaction of the discourse with the institutional settings to which they belong. 
The question of differing audiences is closely linked with the question of the structure of 
decision-making (Jäger, 2001, pp. 47–49). The president primarily needs to persuade Congress 
to get funding for foreign operations, and the nation’s voters to keep the mandate and decision-
making power on foreign operations. When the knowledge behind domestic and international 
audiences clashes it is understandable that compromises need to be made, primarily at the 
expense of global ontologies and ethics.  
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e. In events and discourse histories (Jäger, 2001, p. 49). Crises in Rwanda, Somalia and 
Bosnia are often mentioned as the most important historical discourse contexts that affect the 
development of a discourse strand. The globalist ontologies of the immediate post-cold war 
period were difficult to reconcile with the well-published events in Mogadishu in March 1993, 
when 18 US soldiers were killed. At the same time the experienced consequences of the failure 
to react forcefully in Bosnia and Rwanda have served to boost interventionist arguments.  
Despite dealing with interpretative reality and social constructs, in my investigation I have 
refused to make a random selection of what is important or to put forth loose claims of the 
representative quality of particular constructs. Instead, I have mapped discursive developments 
using computer-assisted textual analysis. For this I have used the NVivo text analysis program.  
First, I selected proxy words for different discourse strands and used word frequency analyses 
to reveal how different discourse strands are related to each other and how this relationship 
develops.  
Second, I coded5 clauses that deal with protection (selecting them by searching for the world 
“protect” in its different forms) for the types of threats against which protection is needed. First, 
I ruled out instances covering protection of Americans and US institutions against non-external 
(for example, protection of American children against crime, decadence or tobacco and the 
like.),6 non-life-threatening threats (protection of US tobacco farmers, economic protectionism, 
etc.) and unintentional threats to the US and Americans (pandemics, environmental 
degradation7, securing of international traffic against technical dangers). Any other threats have 
been included in my further analysis.  
The next phase of relational textual analysis focuses on the referent object of protection: that 
is, who is being protected. When possible, I have done this technically by looking at the 
grammatical reference of the word “protect”. In some cases, though, the referent object of 
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protection needs to be followed further in the paragraph and the speech/letter/interview. In this 
way, all clauses with the word “protect” were included in this relational coding, which 
classified the referent objects into three categories: 1. Protection of the US state and its people 
and institutions from intentional external danger, 2. Protection of allies from comparable 
danger, and 3. Protection crucial to their survival and wellbeing of people and institutions other 
than allied states from internal and external, intentional and non-intentional threats (that is to 
say, genuine cosmopolitan protection; such as protection of citizens in developing countries 
from terror, dictators and criminals, but also from developmental problems).8 I call protection 
in the last category cosmopolitan because it cannot be seen as directly useful to US self-interest.  
For the cosmopolitan type of protection, I also investigated the agency. I identified five types 
of agencies: 1) US agency, 2) allied agency, 3) US-led unrepresentative ad hoc coalition 
agency, 4) bilateral agency – where the US works with a developing country that is not in 
alliance with the US to protect that country and its citizens – and 5) representative international 
agency (UN, ICC, arms control regimes and agencies, and other actors that offer protection 
within countries that are members of the agency).  
While the three first types of agency are clearly unrepresentative – there, somebody is 
protecting somebody else – the last category is undoubtedly representative. The bilateral/other 
agency is more difficult to interpret. This is a category of sentences in which cosmopolitan 
protection takes place in a country or is exercised for citizens of a country that is not allied with 
the US, but where some of the actors of protection, to varying degrees, are practicing the 
protection themselves. These range from US drone programs where sentences suggest the 
participation or acceptance of the local leader, to sentences of protection where the main actor 
is the country itself, but with US encouragement. Most sentences in this category deal with 
situations in which the US military is training and guiding the Afghan and Iraqi government, 
army and police in the protection of their own citizens. 
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Finally, I also coded those clauses where the referent object of protection was cosmopolitan 
(global civilian) according to the method of protection. Driven by the power of militarist 
responses in motivating and legitimizing violence of the anti-US camp (discourse analysis of 
Saddam Hussein’s, Bashar al-Assad’s and Al Qaeda’s texts), I made a distinction between 
power-biased protection and protection that was not power-biased.  
When studying power bias – the preference of power strategies over power-neutral or power-
negative strategies – I have selected the following criteria for clauses in texts that determine 
whether or not they constitute power-centric realities for cosmopolitan protection:  
A clause is power-biased iff the means of protection:  
a) Prevent the act of someone harming or threatening the people to be protect. 
b) Deter someone from harming or threatening the people to be protected.  
c) Reward someone for not harming the people to be protected. 
d) Destroying or weakening someone who is harming or threatening the people to be 
protected. 
It is not power-biased iff protection is conducted:  
a) By action that does not affect the threatening agent (offering asylum etc.) 
b) Against non-intentional threat (poverty, disease, etc.) 
c) By means of self-restraint: protecting democracy by the leaders in an agreement that 
concerns the protector. Here agreements like the Helsinki Act could be considered 
self-restraining, whilst democracy promotion in another country would be power 
biased as it deals with the behaviour of others.  
This computerized textual analysis made it possible to show trends and developments in a 
transparent way. Coding was focused on the elements of the Western discourse that were 
revealed in the discourse analysis of the texts of US enemies (actors that US needed to protect 
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its protegees from) as elements that justified violence by dictators, criminals and terrorists. In 
addition to aiding a test of aspects of qualitative discourse analysis, a computerized textual 
analysis also directed the qualitative analysis to texts that are central and representative of 
various discursive changes or characteristics of the discourse strand.   
The coding on NVivo of the presidential papers and the quantitative data on word and relational 
frequencies are openly available in NVivo, Stata formats respectively, from the replication data 




1 The expansion of security communities is not just a geographic, quantitative, but also a 
qualitative phenomenon. Qualitative expansions of units of security governance (security 
communities), such as gradual democratization (inclusion of civilians into the group of 
protected, and the inclusion of security agency/protectors) and the inclusion of minorities into 
the security community have also reduced violence (Pinker, 2011, pp. 295–480). 
2 Optimally, I would study the entire period from the crumbling of the cold war order at the 
end of the 1980s, until today, but since the available reliable data on state fragility starts from 
1995 and since the reliable data on conflict fatalities end in 2016, the availability of data 
forces me to restrict the analysis of the consequences of protection to the time period that 
starts from the beginning of 1995 and ends at the end of 2016.  
3 To catch all clauses with these words in all their variations, I make my searches by using 
only the root of the words.  
4 Year 2012 is, so far, the latest year for which the USGPO compilation of presidential papers 
is available in NVivo compatible format.  
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5 For help with the development of the nodes and testing the unambiguity of the coding rules, 
I am grateful to Riccardo Boscherini, Thomas Brewis, Maddy Holley and Astrid Vikström, 
6 Since the threat of terrorism in US discourse is clearly externalized, even when the 
perpetrators are US citizens, I ruled all terrorist threats as external despite the fact that in the 
1990s these were often seen as criminal threats rather than international political conspiratorial 
threats. 
7 I coded protection of the environment as a separate category in the openly available dataset, 
but in this chapter it is conflated with “other protection”.  
8 I classified the protection of terrorists by rogue states in the category of protection that I have 
ruled out in the beginning to maintain the normative relevance of this category of protection.  
